On his blog, David Chalmers points out the arrival of a new publication, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism.
From Oxford University Press:
What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience.
"What it is like to be..." is the "hard problem" popularized by Chalmers. The debate on the nature of consciousness is in my opinion one of the most important discussions now underway for its potential to revolutionize what it means to know. The key question: can consciousness and all that it entails - intentionality, meaning-making, representation, the first person experience - can these things be naturalized?
If as Anthony Gottlieb describes in his history of philosophy, The Dream of Reason, the rational enterprise led to the natural sciences, is it poised now to go elsewhere?